The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between board reputation and corporate social performance. Specifically, we claim that corporate social performance may be a function of board attributes and we investigate the association between board reputation -in terms of board composition, competence, diversity, leadership, structure and links with the external environmentand the social performance of firms, after controlling for other company-specific characteristics. In order to explore such a relationship, we analyse the association between corporate social performance and board reputation of the Business Ethics 100 Best Corporate Citizens over the period [2005][2006][2007]. Data on corporate social responsibility are collected from the KLD"s SOCRATES database, which is derived from multiple sources and is not dependent upon corporate self-reporting. Data on board reputation are hand-collected from corporate reports and proxy statements. Our empirical evidence shows that the proportions of independent, community influential and female directors are positively associated with corporate social performance, while the presence of a CSR committee is positively associated with community performance. In contrast, we find that CEO duality and community influential directors with multiple directorships have a negative effect on corporate social performance.
an empirical investigation of the US Best Corporate Citizens
Introduction
The recent financial crisis, the collapse of high profile companies and the increasingly stringent stakeholders pressure have increased debate on corporate governance and board responsibility.
More emphasis is being placed on the ethical, environmental and social responsibilities of the firm towards a broad range of stakeholders in order to establish and enhance the firm"s legitimacy to operate. According to Neu et al. (1998: 265) , organisational legitimacy improves the inflow of resources necessary for the viability of the company (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Neu et al., 1998) , allows for the avoidance of product boycotts and other disruptive actions (Elsbach, 1994) and enhances corporate reputation (de Quevedo-Puente et al., 2007) .
The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between board reputation and corporate social performance amongst the Best US Corporate Citizens. Specifically, we claim that corporate social performance may be a function of board reputation and we classify group the concept of board reputation into several attributes: board composition, competence, diversity, leadership, structure and links with the external environment. We investigate the effects that each of these attributes has on the social performance of firms, after controlling for other company-specific characteristics.
In order to explore such a relationship, we make use of a US-based sample of companies considered the Best Corporate Citizens over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] . We analyse the association between corporate social performance and board reputation of the Business Ethics 100 Best Corporate
Citizens. This dataset has the advantage of providing us with a multidimensional measure of each firm"s social performance. Data on corporate social responsibility are collected from the KLD"s SOCRATES database, which is derived from multiple sources and is not dependent upon corporate self-reporting. Data on board reputation are hand-collected from corporate reports and proxy statements. We employ various measures to proxy for board reputation: the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of community influential directors, the proportion of women, CEO duality, the presence of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee and relational capital (multiple directorates).
We find that board reputation is positively associated with the social performance of the 100 Best Corporate Citizens. Our empirical evidence shows that (i) the proportion of independent directors is positively associated with corporate social performance and environmental performance; (ii) the proportion of community influential directors is positively associated with corporate social performance, community performance and environmental performance; (iii) the proportion of women directors is positively related also with employee relations and human rights performance;
(iv) the presence of a CSR committee is positively associated with community performance and human rights performance. Moreover, we provide empirical support for the hypothesis that CEO duality is detrimental to corporate social performance, as indeed are directors with multiple directorships. This paper makes several contributions. First of all, it explores the relationship between board reputation attributes and corporate social performance, which to the best of our knowledge has not been studied yet in the literature. Second, we provide theoretical and empirical evidence that the effect of board attributes on corporate social performance is depicted more completely when looking at the specific competences of directors, as in the case of community influential directors.
Thus traditional proxies for board composition are not a good prediction of the service role of the board in terms of legitimacy and reputation.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework. The development of hypotheses is presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the research methodology, followed by discussion of the results in section 5. Concluding remarks are presented in the final section.
Theoretical framework
The main question we try to answer in this paper is which characteristics and attributes of the board of directors are related to the corporate social performance of companies. In order to discuss the role of the board of directors with regard to corporate social performance, we will refer to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) , while we will rely on legitimacy theory to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of such a relationship (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) .
The board of directors is the "apex of the decision-making process" (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002: 400) and they are ultimately responsible for corporate social strategy, whether this strategy is "proactively pursued or passively rubber-stamped" (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002: 400) . According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003) , the board of directors plays two different functions: monitoring (control role) and provision of resources (service role). The monitoring function has been mainly analysed following agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) , according to which directors are responsible for monitoring managers on behalf of shareholders, given the potential for conflicts of interest arising with the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932) . On the other hand, the focus on the service role of boards is the perspective adopted in the resource dependence (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2000) and stakeholders" research (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Huse, 2003) .
Indeed, various authors advocate a broadening of the corporate governance agenda to encompass a stakeholder and legitimacy perspective (Tirole, 2001; Huse, 2003; OECD, 2004; Webb, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2006; Deakin and Whittaker, 2007; Brennan and Solomon, 2008) . Following this perspective, the board of directors can be seen a mechanism of legitimacy and reputation, as its role is to ensure that the company is managed efficiently, top management has oversight and stakeholders" interests are taken into consideration at the highest levels of decision making (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010) .
According to resource dependence theory, boards consist of both human capital (experience, expertise and reputation) and relational capital (network of ties to other firms and external contingencies) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003: 383) , thus assuring the management of external dependencies and the provision of important external resources (Hillman et al., 2001) . Directors are seen not only as keepers of shareholders" fiduciary duties, but also as able to enhance the firm"s reputation, by establishing contacts with the external environment and providing top management with insightful advice as to what stakeholders expect from the company. Markarian and Parbonetti (2007: 1225) in examining board of director composition, assert that boards perform different tasks at the same time and that, within the board, each director plays a specific role consistent with her own skills, competencies, professional expertise and links with the external environment that produces "a mosaic of decision making structures and subsequent firm behaviour".
Following Zahra and Pearce, (1989: 297) , in this paper we assume that corporate boards act as "boundary spanners" and perform many roles at the same time, providing four types of benefits to the firm: advice and counselling (Mintzberg, 1983; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) ; legitimacy (Selznick, 1949) ; channels for communicating information between external organisations and the company (Hillman et al., 1999) and preferential access to commitments or support from important stakeholders in the company"s environment (Hillman et al., 2001 ). Thus, directors may do more than reduce uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2000) , as they bring resources and legitimacy to the company (Gales and Kesener, 1994) . Within this framework, the reputation of the directors in the community and among stakeholders enables the company to carry on its business and actions, mobilise external support and resources, and enhance organisational legitimacy (Provan, 1980; Deephouse, 2000) .
Organisational legitimacy has been discussed for some time in the academic literature. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975: 122) suggest "organisations seek to establish congruence between the societal values associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of which they are a part. Insofar as these two value systems are congruent we can speak of organisational legitimacy". Corporate social responsibility has been addressed in the literature (e.g. Husted and Allen, 2000) as a strategy that helps companies in addressing societal concerns about corporate behaviour and thus is able to enhance organisational legitimacy.
According to de Quevedo-Puente et al. (2007: 66) corporate social performance describes "the degree of legitimacy of the firm"s behaviour by the standard of its institutional context", so that a firm is behaving legitimately when its actions are perceived as congruent with society"s expectations (Suchman, 1995) on the social, environmental and economic impact of the firm"s activities. According to Unerman and Bennett (2004: 685) , "good corporate governance and accountability should focus on addressing these social, environmental, economic and ethical expectations".
As firms operate in a constantly changing environment, they must show that they operate within the bounds, values and norms of the society (Brown and Deegan, 1998) . By legitimacy, i.e. the accumulation of similar social performances over time (de Quevedo-Puente et al., 2007) , the firm is able to consolidate its corporate reputation (Fombrun and Rindova, 1994; Rao, 1994) .
Corporate social performance has been widely discussed in the literature (see, e.g. Carroll, 1979 and Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Clarkson, 1995) , as being a multidimensional concept (Johnson and Greening, 1999) , associated with corporate legitimacy (de Quevedo-Puente et al., 2007) and built on a set of principles, processes and policies (Wood, 1991) .
The effects of boards" characteristics on social performance, defined as the outcome of the firm"s social strategy (Husted and Allen, 2000) , will be studied with reference to the various roles played by the board and the directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) , considering that, by establishing external ties with stakeholders and the wider society, directors are able to attract and retain precious resources to the firm"s survival and thus enhance the organisational legitimacy (Zahra and Pearce, 1989: 297) . Based on the above considerations and given the lack of significant board variables in social performance studies, our objective is to investigate whether board reputation has an effect on corporate social performance.
Development of hypotheses
Based on the idea that corporate governance encompasses all "the interests that affect the viability, competence and moral character of an enterprise" (Selznick, 1992: 290; Worthy and Neuschel, 1983; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) and that board reputation consists of both human capital, in terms of experience, expertise, leadership, and of relational capital, in terms of ties with external contingencies (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) , we analyse the impact of board composition, competence, diversity, leadership, structure and links with the external environment on corporate social performance.
Board composition -Independent directors
According to the resource dependence framework (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) , independent directors attract valuable resources vital to the companies" viability by establishing external links with stakeholders and other organisations and they enhance the reputation of the firm (Certo et al., 2001 ). The presence of independent directors on the board should increase the board"s objectivity and its ability to represent multiple points of view of the firm"s role in the environment and among stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) . Moreover, according to Johnson and Greening (1999: 569) , by representing various constituents and being knowledgeable about the critical contingencies facing firms, they "may be more inclined to comply with environmental standards to avoid penalties, fines and negative media exposure and a subsequent loss of reputation". In this sense, they "reflect changing societal values in shaping corporate identity because boards lack requisite power to bring about desired changes in the role of the corporation" (Zahra and Pearce, 1989: 304) . Wang and Dewhirst (1992) find that outside directors are likely to have a stakeholder orientation and are conscious of the expectations of the different constituencies of the firm. Johnson and Greening (1999) find empirical support for their hypothesis that outside directors" representation is positively associated with corporate social performance. The theoretical argument behind these findings is that, by being more dedicated to stakeholders" expectations, independent directors will increase their own prestige and role in society and thus they will be more likely to encourage the company to undertake CSR activities.
If independent directors are likely to respect the stakeholder obligations of the firm, they are more likely to be committed to stakeholder responsibility because in this way they increase their prestige and role in society (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) . Hence, we present our first research hypothesis, in alternative form:
H1: Corporate social performance is positively associated with the proportion of independent directors.
Board competence -community influential directors
Previous research on corporate governance and social performance has mainly concentrated on the role played by outside (independent) directors (see, e.g. Johnson and Greening, 1999) .
Following Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Markarian and Parbonetti (2007) , non-executive directors are not homogeneous in terms of skills, competencies, expertise and networks with the external environment. We argue that the specific and unique individual competencies of board directors contribute differently to the board process and priorities, thus motivating management to adopt specific strategies and actions (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991) . In order to understand the impact that diversity in terms of competencies and backgrounds of directors has on social performance, we concentrate on community influential directors (Hillman et al., 2000; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010) . Community influential directors (hereafter "community influentials") typically are "directors with experience and linkages relevant to the firm"s environment beyond competitor firms and suppliers.
Community influentials include directors who possess knowledge about or influence over important non-business organisations" (Hillman et al., 2000: 241) 1 . They are mainly political and religious leaders, university faculty, and members of social or community organisations, including military officers (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986; Hillman et al., 2000) . By supplying the firm with linkages to society beyond the competitive context, they bring experience and connection to community groups and organisations (Baron, 1995) , like societal movements and non-profit organisations.
According to Hillman et al. (2000: 242) , community influentials "provide valuable non-business perspectives on proposed actions and strategies". In this sense, their competence, expertise and influence on societal constituencies help the firm in avoiding strategic choices and actions against the interests of such constituencies and promoting socially responsible actions.
The presence of community influentials on the board helps in obtaining commitments or support from important stakeholders and, by establishing these relationships with stakeholder groups, they provide legitimacy to the company. According to Kassinis and Vafeas (2002: 401) , community influentials are "less likely to tolerate environmental irresponsibility because their interests are more closely aligned with the interests of the community at large". Since they provide the board with better knowledge about stakeholders" needs and expectations, they enhance the board awareness about stakeholders" expectations and ensure that their interests are taken into account during corporate decision making (Selznick, 1992) . As a consequence, they might promote corporate social performance in order to ensure congruence between the firm"s decisions and societal values. This leads us to the formulation of the second hypothesis, in alternative form:
H2: Corporate social performance is positively associated with the proportion of community influentials.
Board diversity -women on the board
According to Coffey and Wang (1998) , board diversity is defined as variation among its members 2 .
The relevance of female presence on the board is stressed by Hillman et al. (2002) and more recently by Adams and Ferreira (2009) , according to whom they are increasingly being appointed to corporate boards. According to the literature on gender-based differences, women and men are different in the way they play their leadership role: while men are characterised mainly to agentic 3 attributes (Eagly et al., 2003) , women are more ascribed to communal characteristics. Communal characteristics are concerned primarily with the welfare of other people, helpfulness, kindness, sympathy, sensitivity, nurturing and gentleness. According to Nielsen and Huse (2010) such elements are translated in working situations into accepting others" positions, supporting and soothing others and contributing to relational and interpersonal problems. Moreover, research has found evidence that female directors are more likely to be cooperative and collaborative and they are more oriented towards improving and enhancing the others" self-worth (Eagly et al., 2003) .
According to Siciliano (1996) , board gender diversity improves organisational performance because it provides new insights and perspectives. Bilimoria (2000: 27) suggests that women are valued as board members for their ability to "provide strategic input and generate productive discourse".
Such abilities, combined with the communal characteristics predominant in female directors, are more likely to lead to the women"s active involvement in issues of a strategic nature that concern the firm and its stakeholders. Thus "women may be particularly sensitive to -and may exercise influence on -decisions pertaining to certain organisational practices, such as corporate social responsibility and environmental politics" (Nielsen and Huse, 2010: 138) . This leads us to the formulation of the third hypothesis, in alternative form:
H3: Corporate social performance is positively associated with the proportion of women directors.
Board leadership -CEO duality
CEO duality occurs when one individual serves as both chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer. Best practice in corporate governance recommends the separation of the role of the chairman from that of the CEO (OECD, 2004) , in order to ensure a frank and honest discussion of the performance of the firm (Carver, 1990) . According to Fama and Jensen (1983: 314) CEO duality "signals the absence of separation between decision control and decision management". Forker (1992: 117) adds that "a dominant personality commanding a company may be detrimental to the interest of shareholders". Roberts et al. (2005) assert that CEO duality constrains board independence, as combining the role of CEO and chairman compromises the system of checks and balances and represents a conflict of interests, thus reducing the overall accountability of the firm.
Thus, based on the agency arguments of Forker (1992) and Roberts et al. (2005) , CEO duality reduces the overall legitimacy of the company in front of stakeholders.
In contrast to agency theory, organisation theory supports the idea that strong leadership could be interpreted as a characteristic that brings legitimacy, as it sends a signal to stakeholders that the firm has a clear direction (Salancik and Meindl, 1984) and that "someone is in charge and that the fate of the organisation depends on that person" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 263) . Thus, CEO duality could help a firm maintaining its relationships with stakeholders by invoking a sense of managerial efficacy because "the consolidation of the two most senior management positions establishes a unity of command at the top of the firm, with unambiguous leadership clarifying decision-making authority and sending reassuring signals to stakeholders" (Finkelstein and D"Aveni, 1994: 1080) .
Given the two contrasting perspectives, we formulate the CEO duality hypothesis in the null form, with two competing alternative hypotheses:
H4: Corporate social performance is not associated with CEO duality.
The alternative hypothesis of a negative association is based on agency theory, while the alternative hypothesis of a positive association is based on organisation theory.
Board structure -presence of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee
Board reputation is not just a function of the composition of the board as a whole, but it also depends on the structure and composition of its subcommittees (Xie et al., 2003) . According to Zahra and Pearce (1989) , the firm"s board structure affects the directors" commitment and involvement in shaping the goals and strategy of the firm, because it defines the internal organisation and division of tasks among the board"s committees. Furthermore, most important board decisions are taken at a committee level (Kesner, 1988) .
A firm actively engaging with stakeholders can undertake various decisions and actions at board level in order to manage social responsibility, sustainability or ethical issues. In particular, the presence of a corporate social responsibility committee 4 , or of a director in charge of such issues indicates an active strategic posture (Ullman, 1985) with regards to stakeholder relationships.
Such a committee is involved in the stakeholder engagement process and in the way the firm turns social strategy into action. The presence of a CSR committee can be interpreted as a signal that the firm sends to stakeholders in order to show its commitment and involvement in CSR (Lam and Li, 2007) . Post et al. (2002) assert that a CSR committee is responsible for reviewing policies and conduct with respect to the firm"s principles and commitment to ethical and social responsibility issues. Thus the presence of a CSR committee should reveal the firm"s willingness to improve its corporate behaviour to meet stakeholders" expectations. Hence, we hypothesise in alternative form:
H5: Corporate social performance is positively associated with the presence of a CSR committee.
4 Such a committee may also be called the sustainability committee or ethics committee.
Board relational capital -other directorates
According to resource dependence theory, board relational capital refers to the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by each director (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) . In order to understand whether the board"s relational capital helps in the provision of both advice and counselling, and reputation, we will refer to the board"s directorate ties to external organisations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state that prestigious organisations represented on the board provide assurance to external stakeholders of the value and worth of the firm, as the firm"s reputation is affected not just by who serves on the board, but also to whom the firm is linked (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983) . In this vein, directorate ties may help the firm in attracting critical resources, improving corporate reputation and thus ensuring improved performance.
Previous research found that boards having ties with strategically related organisations are able to provide better strategic guidelines and thus improve firm performance (Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) . Moreover, empirical studies show that boards with great prestige experience less underpricing during an IPO (Certo et al., 2001; Kassinin and Vafeas, 2002) .
Nevertheless, recent discussion (Di Pietra et al., 2008) suggests that independent directors may not properly fulfil their functions if they serve on too many boards, as they cannot adequately comply with all their duties. Directors with too many appointments would not be able to provide enough and adequate attention not only to monitor and evaluate management"s behaviour, but also to advice and counsel the firm, attract critical resource and increase the firm"s reputation.
Given the opposing views on the effects of multiple directorships on board performance, we state our last research hypothesis in null form, with two competing alternative hypotheses:
H6: Corporate social performance is not associated with the board"s relational capital.
The alternative hypothesis of a positive association is based on enhanced reputation, while the alternative hypothesis of a negative association is based on perceived inadequacy of commitment.
Research method

Sample
The initial sample for this study consists of the 100 companies listed in the Business Ethics 100
Best Given that some companies were listed for more than one year in succession whilst others were listed for only one year and that we lost some observations because of lack of data, the total number of observations is 278 and the total number of companies is 176 6 . For each company and year, archival data about board reputation and CSR performance are collected as follows.
Measures of corporate social performance
Data on corporate social performance are collected from the KLD"s SOCRATES database, which is a comprehensive research database measuring the social performance of corporations. Safety. For each area, KLD analysts assign "strengths" and "concerns" on a 5-point scale. Each area score is then determined by subtracting the concerns scores from the strengths scores. Data are collected in a disciplined process from a wide variety of company, government, and nongovernment organisations and media sources. Once the information is collected, KLD rates the social performance of companies using a proprietary framework of positive and negative indicators.
KLD data have been extensively used in the management literature on corporate social and environmental performance (see, e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001; David et al., 2007) as well as recent social and environmental accounting research (see, e.g., Cho et al., 2006; Cho and Patten, 2007) .
Given the multi-dimensionality of the concept of corporate social performance, we make use of several measures based on KLD"s data: community performance (comm), employee relations performance (er), environmental performance (env), human rights performance (hr) and product quality performance (pr) ratings. We exclude, on the grounds of potential endogeneity problems, both the KLD ratings regarding the firm"s governance and diversity.
Moreover, we employ an overall corporate social performance (csp) rating, determined as the average of the ratings obtained in the community, employee relations, environment, human rights and product quality areas.
Governance related variables
Data on board composition are collected from the firms" annual reports and proxy statements. For each company it was possible to find the name and the type of directors (i.e.
executive or independent non-executive director), a description of their role within the board (i.e. 
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Control variables
We select control variables on the basis of prior studies on governance and corporate performance.
First of all, we consider other board variables that may have an impact on corporate social performance. Following Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), we control for board size (bsize).
We select accounting performance, size and industry as control variables based on prior studies (Ullman, 1985; Johnson and Greening, 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2003; Brammer et al., 2006) investigating the determinants of social performance.
Following Ullman (1985) , we assume financial performance influences the financial capability to undertake costly programs related to social demands. We measure financial performance (roe) as the return on equity.
According to Burke et al. (1986) , as firms grow they are more likely to adopt CSR principles because of the increased pressures the firms experience from various stakeholders. We measure size (size) as the natural logarithm of total sales.
The nature of a company"s industry has been identified as a factor potentially driving corporate social performance. For example, companies whose economic activities modify the environment, such as natural resources companies (mining, forestry, oil and gas, etc.) are clearly more closely monitored for environmental performance than companies in other industries (Dierkes and Preston, 1977) while consumer-oriented companies may exhibit greater concern about demonstrating their social involvement to the community, since it is likely to affect the corporate reputation and therefore influence sales (Cowen et al., 1987) . Companies in the sample belong to nine industries (basic industries, cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical consumer goods, cyclical services, noncyclical services, financial, general industrial, information technology, utilities), thus we employ eight dummies.
Data analysis
We consider panel data techniques to be the most suitable for testing our hypotheses. Given that we find cross-section heteroskedasticity, the fixed effects models with cross-section heteroskedasticity cannot be efficiently estimated with OLS. Thus, we specify the following panel corrected standard error model (Wooldridge, 2002) :
Where: Table 1 shows the social performance ratings of the companies in the sample. The overall social performance score (csp) takes into account all strengths and weaknesses of each component considered. The mean is 0.771, and the standard deviation is 0.455. On average, companies seem to perform better with issues involving community relations (the mean for comm is 1.194, and the maximum is almost 5.0) and employee relations (the mean for er is 1.013, and the maximum is 4.661). Major concerns can be identified in issues regarding human rights (the mean for hr is 0.166, and the minimum is -4.289) and product quality and safety (the mean for pr is 0.529, and the minimum is -2.921). From the standard deviation data, we can also say that there seems to be great variation among companies in the sample about how they deal with the different CSR areas. The community and environmental issues present the largest variance. On the other side, human rights (hr) and product quality and safety (pr) issues seem to be more uniformly managed by companies in the sample. Over the three-years the social performance of companies seems to improve in all areas, except for human rights (hr) and product quality and safety (pr), which show a decrease in year 2006.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE while community influentials seem to be slightly busier with a mean of 3.675 directorships (median value for ratio_cidir is 3.5).
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Descriptive statistics for the control variables are reported in Table 3 . On average, boards are made up of 10 members (bsize), the median value is 11 and the maximum value is 28. Companies in the sample present on average a roe equal to almost 20% and size is, on average, about $11,700,000 net sales.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE Table 4 shows the Pearson"s correlation matrix. The overall social performance score (csp) is significantly and positively correlated to the proportion of community influentials (pci), the proportion of women (pw), the presence of a CSR committee (csr_board), the number of directorships of the independent directors (ratio_neddir) and it is negatively correlated to CEO duality (dual).
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
The correlation analysis also shows significant pairwise correlations among the independent variables. In order to test whether relevant multi-collinearity can affect the results, we performed the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. The largest value among all the independent variables is often used as an indicator of the severity of multi-collinearity (Neter et al., 1996) . A maximum VIF value in excess of 10 is frequently taken as an indication that multi-collinearity may be unduly influencing the least squares estimate. In our case, the largest VIF is equal to 2.29, so multicollinearity among the predictor variables is not a problem. Table 5 provides the results for the multivariate regression model. Models 1 to 6 depict the relationships between our variables of interest and the six measures of corporate social performance employed in the study, respectively: the overall social performance (csp), and its constituent components: community performance (comm), employee relations (er), environmental performance (env), human rights (hr) and product quality and safety (pr) 8 .
Multivariate results
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Model 1 investigates the relationships between the overall social performance (csp) and the variables of interest. The R 2 is 0.198 and the model appears highly significant (chi square = 55.79, p = 0.000). As regards our variables of interest, the proportion of independent directors (prind) (H1), community influentials (pci) (H2) and women directors (pw) (H3) are significantly associated with the overall social performance (csp) with the expected sign. The proportion of independent directors (prind) (H1) and the proportion of community influentials (pci) (H2) on the board of directors are both positively related to the overall social performance (csp), suggesting that the presence of independent directors and community influentials both enhance board awareness about stakeholders" expectations and promote corporate social performance in order to ensure congruence between the firm"s decisions and stakeholders" values. The proportion of women directors (pw) (H3) is also positively associated with the overall social performance (csp) suggesting that the presence of women on the board increases the awareness of the company on issues relating to various stakeholders and thus leads to greater social performance. CEO duality (dual) (H4) is also significantly associated with the overall social performance (csp) and the sign of the relationship is negative, providing empirical support for the alternative hypothesis of a negative association as predicted by agency theory. Thus, the empirical analysis supports the advocates of the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman and the agency theory hypothesis that CEO duality reduces the overall legitimacy of the company for its stakeholders. Model 1 provides mixed empirical support of a relationship between the board"s relational capital proxies (ratio_neddir, ratio_cidir) (H6) and the overall corporate social performance: while the average number of directorships held by nonexecutive directors (ratio_neddir) is positively associated with the overall social performance (csp), the average number of directorships held by community influentials (ratio_cidir) is negatively associated with it. Such evidence is in line with the idea that boards with great prestige in terms of the external directorships of non-executive directors benefit in terms of stakeholders" legitimacy (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002) but, when non-executive directors are community influentials, the fact that they serve on many boards is detrimental to the legitimacy of the company as they cannot adequately play their service function, in line with the results of Di Pietra et al. (2008) .
Model 2 provides empirical evidence of the relationship between community performance (comm) and board reputation. Model 2 is the model with greatest predictive power: the R 2 is 0.308 and the model appears highly significant (chi square = 142.18, p = 0.000). Among the proxies for board reputation, we find a significant association between community performance (comm) and the proportion of community influentials (pci) (H2), the proportion of women directors (pw) (H3) and the presence of a CSR committee (csr_board) (H5). The findings thus suggest that community influentials are able to focus the attention of the board on the impact of the company"s activity on the community. Female directors" communal characteristics (i.e. friendly, kind, unselfish, concerned with others, and expressive, Eagly et al., 2003) increase the sensitivity of the board towards external stakeholders" needs. The CSR committee, which is in charge of activities and strategies relating to ethical, environmental and social issues, is more likely to increase the legitimacy of the company in the community.
In Model 3, as regards our variables of interest, only the proportion of women directors (pw) (H3) and CEO duality (dual) (H4) appear to be related to the corporate social performance measured as relations with the employees (er). The estimated coefficients are significant and they have the expected sign. The coefficient for the proportion of women directors (pw) (H3) is positive, thus supporting the hypothesis of a positive association between the proportion of women directors and corporate social performance. Such a result could be interpreted along the lines that boards with a greater proportion of women directors are more sensitive to others" needs and self-worth. The coefficient for CEO duality (dual) (H4) is negative, supporting the alternative hypothesis formulated by agency theory that CEO duality reduces the ability of the company to pursue and implement socially responsible strategies, rather than the organisation theory hypothesis that strong leadership is a characteristic that brings legitimacy.
Model 4 provides the regression coefficients when corporate social performance is measured along the environmental dimension (env). The proportion of independent directors (prind) (H1) and the proportion of community influentials (pci) (H2) are both significantly and positively associated with environmental performance (env). This evidence supports the idea that independent directors (H1) and community influentials (H2) are more likely to consider stakeholders" needs and expectations in particular regarding the environmental impacts of corporate activities.
Model 5 provides evidence of a relationship between the proportion of women directors (pw) (H3), the presence of the CSR committee (csr_board) (H5) and corporate social performance, measured along the human rights dimension (hr). The empirical evidence suggests that a sensitive and proactive board on stakeholders" needs and issues is associated with greater strengths in human rights.
We find mixed evidence of the relationship between the relational capital of the board (ratio_neddir, ratio_cidir) (H6) and corporate social performance, measured along the human rights dimension (hr). The external directorships of non-executives (ratio_neddir) are positively related to human rights performance (hr), supporting the idea that they bring greater prestige and awareness of sensitive issues. When the board relational capital is measured as the average number of directorships of community influentials (ratio_cidir), we find a negative sign for this relationship, thus suggesting that while community influentials are likely per se to improve social performance, they are detrimental to it if they have many directorships. The evidence confirms that community influentials are not able to properly fulfil their functions if they serve on too many boards and thus are not able to increase the firm"s social performance.
Model 6 provides quite surprising results, given that it shows a significant and negative relationship between the proportion of community influentials (pci) (H2) and corporate social performance measured along the product quality and safety dimension (pr). A possible explanation of this negative relationship is that a community influential director may not have adequate competences to improve product quality and safety and thus concentrates the efforts of the company in other areas of social performance such as community or the environment.
Finally the models, in line with previous findings (e.g. Ullman, 1985) , depict a size and industry effect.
Robustness results
In order to test the robustness of our results, we ran a number of alternative models. In particular we ran the regressions using both the fixed effects model and the first difference model. In both cases, the results do not vary significantly from those reported in the previous section and hence the detailed results are not reported here. The only relevant change in results under these two models is obtained with respect to the proportion of independent directors (prind) (H1) which is not significantly associated with corporate social performance measured as the overall average score (csp) and along the environmental dimension (env).
We have also taken into consideration that our results may suffer from an endogeneity problem due to the potential endogenous relationship between community influentials and social performance. Thus, we perform a three-stage least square regression model using two simultaneous equations. Particularly, equation (2) shows the effect of community influentials over the overall performance score while equation (3) tests the effect of social performance over community influentials.
(2)
Where:
csp Measure of corporate social performance. It refers to the KLD overall and social components ratings (csp, comm, er, env, hr, pr) The results are presented in Table 6 . Columns (A) and (B) report results respectively for equations 
, thus confirming that community influentials play a role in orienting corporate social performance.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the relationship between board reputation, in terms of composition, competence, diversity, leadership, structure and links with the external environment, and the social performance of Best Corporate Citizens, after controlling for other company-specific characteristics. By doing so, we extend previous studies on social performance, by considering board reputation as a governance contextual factor that can influence the ability of the company to be involved in socially responsible actions.
Our results show that board reputation plays a role in driving corporate social performance in the companies that are the Best Corporate Citizens.
Our first hypothesis on the association between the proportion of independent directors and corporate social performance (H1) is supported by our statistical tests for the overall social performance and for the component of social performance measured along the environmental dimension.
The empirical analysis also provides support for the second hypothesis regarding the role of community influential directors, who have been identified as promoters of stakeholders" engagement and management. We find a significant and positive association between the proportion of community influentials and our measure of overall corporate social performance (H2). Such positive association also holds for two components of corporate social performance: community performance and environmental performance.
Together the evidence suggests that the traditional dichotomy between insiders and outsiders may not depict well the service role of the board in terms of legitimacy and reputation. Research that relates corporate governance and social performance should thus more specifically consider the various individual characteristics of directors that may have an impact on various corporate processes carried out by the board of directors.
Regarding our third hypothesis on the role of women on the board, we find a significant and positive relationship between the proportion of women on the board and the overall social performance (H3), community performance, employee relations and human rights. Such evidence suggests that women directors enhance sensitivity towards others and their consideration of the multiple interests of stakeholders is able to improve the service role of the board of directors and thus lead to greater legitimacy and social performance.
We provide empirical evidence that best standards of corporate governance also matter in terms of how the company performs socially. Our empirical evidence supports the alternative hypothesis formulated on the basis of agency theory of a negative relationship between CEO duality and corporate social performance (H4), suggesting that when the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board are concentrated in the hands of the same person, the company is less likely to be involved in socially responsible activities, or at least, it is likely to be associated with lower corporate social performance.
The empirical results also support our fifth hypothesis, providing evidence of a significant and positive relationship between the presence of a CSR committee and corporate social performance (H5) measured along the community dimension. When the board appoints a committee to manage and work on the social and environmental impacts of business activities, it is more likely that the company will have a greater legitimacy in the community in which it operates.
Regarding the results on the relationship between a board"s relational capital and corporate social performance (H6), the empirical evidence supports the alternative hypothesis of a positive association (enhances reputation) when a board"s relational capital is measured by the number of directorships of non-executive directors. This can be interpreted along the lines that when independent directors have a greater number of ties with other organisations, then they are able to provide better strategic guidelines on how to manage the social impacts of corporate activities. On the other hand, the empirical evidence also supports the alternative hypothesis of a negative association (perceived inadequacy of commitment) when a board"s relational capital is measured by the number of directorships of community influentials. The empirical results suggest that, although community influential directors are likely to be associated with higher levels of social performance, when they hold too many directorships, their contribution to the overall success of CSR is negative.
The evidence thus supports the view that community influential directors with too many directorships are not able to successfully contribute to corporate social performance.
Summing up, we are of the view that companies which have CSR more "at their heart" seem to benefit from this approach: indeed, taken overall, the appointment of community influential and women directors to the board and the presence of a CSR Committee have a positive impact on corporate social performance. On the other hand, where companies exhibit corporate governance that does not meet generally accepted best standards (for example, they combine the roles of Chairman and CEO) there is a negative effect on social performance.
Our paper provides both theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical perspective, in times of great debate about the role of the board of directors in driving corporate performance in an ethical and responsible way, it shows that research on corporate governance needs to move beyond the paradigms of agency theory to overcome the traditional distinction between executive and nonexecutive directors, because of the non-homogeneity in terms of backgrounds, competencies and effects on how the board performs its various roles. From a practical perspective, the findings provide useful insights to governance standard setters, regulators and investors interested in the triple bottom line performance of companies, and the important role of the board of directors in addressing CSR activities and their outcomes. 
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